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Welcome to the 7th AGBA World Congress!
We would like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to all delegates
attending AGBA's 7th World Congress being held in collaboration with the Graduate
School of Management (GSM), Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) on Dec. 1-3, 2010!
GSM at UPM has been designated as the "Top Business School of Malaysia",
that is seeking AACSB accreditation.
More than 147 AGBA delegates are participating in a wonderful program, that
includes more than 67 delegates hailing from Islamic Republic oflran! AGBA is proud to
offer special sessions in the Iranian language (Persian) to demonstrate its commitment to
globalization. The main theme of our conference is "Business and Entrepreneurship
Development in a Globalized Era". Our conference will feature competitive papers and
special sessions.
Our conference's primary goal is to provide a unique global platform to facilitate
the exchange of leading-edge ideas for effective advancement of knowledge in business
and entrepreneurship; where academics and professionals from both developed and
developing countries are engaged in intellectual discourse for the generation and
dissemination of knowledge to facilitate the globalization process for the betterment of
humanity. This will be achieved through multidisciplinary presentations and discussions
of current business and development issues in emerging and developed countries. Your
participation is helping us achieve these goals!!!!
Thank you for coming to Malaysia, a model nation for developing countries; that
is determined to become a developed nation by 2020 under its New Economic Model
(NEM).
We wish you good luck in your presentations.
Mary B. Teagarden
Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona, USA
Zainal Abidin Mohamed
Graduate School of Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia
Wolfgang Hinck
Berkeley College, New York, USA
Hossein Nezakati
Graduate School of Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia
Zafar U. Ahmed
Graduate School of Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia
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AGBABrief
Established in the American State of Texas as a "Not-for-Profit"
organization in 2000, AGBA is proud to boast today a membership of more
than 1000 members based in more than 50 countries, that include scholars
from reputed academic institutions, corporate leaders, consultants,
governmental officials and entrepreneurs based in western and developing
countries.
AGBA, as a global organization, aims to help academics and scholars
at business schools across the developing countries to connect with the
western/developed world for mutual benefit. Such collaboration would
accelerate the process of globalization by furnishing ample opportunities to
scholars in emerging countries to get recognition, disseminate new
knowledge and assert themselves on the global stage.
AGBA IS Vision:
To be globally recognized as a leading "not-for-profit" organization
dedicated to serve the academic, professional, government, corporate and
entrepreneurial sectors worldwide.
AGBA IS Mission:
Building on the dynamics of the ongoing globalization process, AGBA is
committed to provide a global platform aimed at assisting academics,
scholars, consultants, professionals, officials and entrepreneurs of
developing countries to assert themselves on the global stage for recognition,
networking and dissemination of knowledge.
AGBA's Core Business:
• Nurture globally competitive talents; expertise and skills across the
developing world;
• Arrange apprenticeship for academics, scholars, professionals,
officials, consultants, and entrepreneurs on the global stage;
• Provide advisory services in the fields of commerce, trade, industry;
• Offer customized training worldwide;
• Offer professional development programs;
• Provide knowledge management services; and
• Provide industry development services.
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Environment:
AGBA believes in promoting strategic alliances among business schools
across the emerging countries in order to assist them for upgrading their
teaching pedagogy, research and professional services to global standards of
excellence as mandated by Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business (AACSB --- www.aacsb.edu).
Sustainability:
• AGBA's power of sustainability comes from the following sources:
• Its tax-exempt status as an "Not-for-Profit" entity incorporated in the
American State of Texas to support its endeavors and pursuits across
the world;
• AGBA's affiliation with prominent business schools across the
developing world provides flexibility and a springboard for
professional programs, projects and pursuits;
• AGBA's global platform where West meets with the East, and the
North meets with the South; and
• Variegated, rich, and vast expertise, skills and competencies of its
more than 1000 members hailing from more than 50 countries
significantly contribute to sustainability on the global stage.
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Role and Authority:
An Empirical Study on Internal Auditors in Malaysia
Sarimah Umor, Nurmazilah Mahzan, Norhayah Zulkifli
o\bstract: This paper addresses the relationship between the roles of the internal auditor
JA) and authority. The internal auditor's varying roles that include control oversight,
decision support, risk management support, governance, system involvement, technical
and intimidation, are determined by how the internal auditor himself perceives his
work and the extent of which he enjoys role clarity. The results show that although the
:nanagement intimidation role is dominant in explaining the variance in authority, this
construct only explains l3.7 percent variance in authority. These results support the
need for the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) to provide internal auditors with
adequate interpretation of its standards to identify 'the appropriate level of authority for
their roles. Considerable attention should be given to the audit charter, to specify the
lA's varying roles, according to the nature and the business environment of the
organization. In addition, by taking a holistic view of a what a true professional is, this
study provides some empirical evidence on the association between internal auditor
roles and other aspects of a true profession such as audit charter existence and
employment type. The inclusion of these variables helps to conceptualize and explain
the influence on the internal auditor's roles. From a practical standpoint, internal
auditors may re-evaluate their actual roles, and from the various roles that they have
undertaken, clarify the confusion that might have occurred concerning their roles. The
results provide clear action directives for organizations concerned with the enhancement
of the internal audit profession. Providing internal auditors with the authority to perform
their work is perhaps the most important part of what organizations can do. Authority
has the most pervasive direct and indirect influence upon internal auditors' role clarity.
Thus, this study contributes towards the decision making of boards of directors, audit
committees and other regulatory bodies, to augment the profession of internal auditors.
Key words: Role, Authority, Internal Auditors
1. Introduction
'he increasing complexity of business transactions together with a more dynamic
egulatory environment in the Asian region has created pressure on the internal audit
rofession to change and keep abreast with the ever increasing business challenges.
'inancial reporting of improprieties and business failures in companies such as the
latyam Group in India, Enron, AIG and Lehman Brothers in the USA, Megan Media
"ransmiles and Sime darby in Malaysia have brought the attention towards the
mportant roles on internal audit function and whether it can become the "eyes and
ars" of the senior management and directors. Ernst and Young in 2008 identified in
heir study that internal auditors in Malaysia primarily focusing on traditional role of
:iving assurance on control and risk management ( Ernst and Young, 2008). The study
lid not address any work done by internal auditors with respect to the governance
.tructure and process of the organization. It is also argued that internal auditors in
vlalaysia are struggling to maintain their identity and purpose as the organizations they
.erve undergo turbulent times while their findings are not acted upon.
:ienerally, the role of the internal auditors, as part of the standards framework, is to
assist all members of the management team as well as the directors by furnishing them
with analyses, appraisals, recommendations and pertinent comments concerning the
activities reviewed. Globally, the role of the internal auditors is constantly evolving,
spanning from reviewing governance, risk and control, to becoming internal consultants
on mergers and acquisitions. (PWC, 2008; Harris Dua, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2008;
George and Norman, 2008; KPMG, 2007; Russell 1., 2007). Indeed, internal auditors in
many organizations undertake various roles to independently evaluate management
effectiveness and aid management; Evaluating management effectiveness and aiding
management in turn, causes the problems of role ambiguity (Timothy and Lawrence,
2005; Van Peursem, 2005, 2004; Glascock, 2002; Mc Call, 2002; Tarr, 2002; Broody
and Lowe, 2000; Flesher and Zanzig, 2000; Cooper et aI., 1996; Burns et aI., I994).
Role ambiguity is defined as the perception that one lacks the information necessary to
perform a job or task, which results in the person feeling incapacitated (Vincent, 2008).
If this fundamental issue of role ambiguity or uncertainty is unresolved, internal
auditors are likely to face attempts by various organizational interest groups to pressure
them into performing certain tasks that conflict with their core role (Greenspan et aI.,
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994). The ambiguity and increasing complexity characteristic of today's professional
zork underline the need to provide internal auditors with clear and strong authority.
n many instances, the management of organizations have sought to redefine internal
uditor roles . These attempts at redefinition create tension, confusion and vagueness
mong internal auditors, and must be addressed .. To perform their roles effectively,
rternal auditors need independence from the management, and be allowed unrestricted
valuation of management activities and personnel. This could be achieved by means of
re right authority. Extant literature reveals that the management is more likely to
omply with internal auditors' recommendations if there is authority when the internal
.uditors press for action. In this situation, if senior management is externally motivated
o follow the recommendations, internal auditors may enjoy certain "cruciality", which
neans the occupation has an indispensable, faieful relationship with its clientele,
:mployers or other public. The authority to influence may be acquired in a number of
vays: through the existence of an audit charter, a strong audit committee, a strong
irofessional association, or through other policies that give internal auditors direct and
nfluential access to the highest level of management within or outside an organization
Burns et aI., 1994).
nternal auditing has undergone dramatic changes; its scope expanded in a way that
1I10wsit to make greater contributions to the organization it serves (KPMG, 2008; Ernst
~ Young, 2008; PWC, 2008; Fadzil et aI., 2005). However, the varying roles of internal
tuditors in some situations create role ambiguity (Lawrence and William, 2007; Van
)eursam, 2004; Glascock, 2002, Me Call, 2002, Tarr, 2002, Broody and Lowe, 2000;
~Iesher and Zanzig, 2000; Timothy and Lawrence, 2000; Cooper et aI., 1996; Burns et
11., 1994; Gupta and Fogarty, 1993; Pincus, 1991; Budner, 1962). According to Jackson
md Schuler (1985), role ambiguity has a negative relationship with autonomy, job
enure, and job performance. Role ambiguity is also negatively associated with the job
ierformance of auditors (Gregson et aI., 1994; Rebele and Michaels, 1990; Viator,
WOla,2001b).
Authority has been studied in a wide variety of occupational and professional settings.
Specifically, authority within the internal audit profession has been studied since the
early 70's (Van Peursem, 2005, 2004; O'Regan, 2001; Mort, 2001; KPMG, 1997;
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Iyers and Grambling, 1997; Sawyer and Vinten, 1996; Bums et al., 1994;
engermann, 1972; Engel, 1970). During the course of auditing, internal auditors
ndertake different roles, ranging from basic functions to more complex tasks. Internal
uditors play an important role in evaluating the effectiveness of control systems.
ecause of their position and authority in the organizational setting, internal auditors
ften play a significant monitoring role (COSO, 2003). Therefore, the degree of
ivolvement in different tasks due to the varying roles may be influenced by the
uthority they have in the organizational setting.
'oncerns have been raised overinternal auditors' real level of authority, in particular,
egarding the mystique that they enjoy, and the strength in which their role is viewed by
thers (Burns et al., 1994). Mystique includes.a great deal of what is meant by
xpertise, technical knowhow or specialized training; however, it involves much more
Ian just competence or skill.. The vital ingredient in mystique is that the work is seen
s ambiguous, incomprehensible and consisting of doing things that ordinary humans,
I the lay perception, cannot do (David and William, 1977). Mystique creates authority
ver clientele, employers or other work audiences. Authority has been defined as the
uspension of judgment in the presence of a significant other (Friedrich, 1958). This
articular sort of authority, arising out of the layman's suspension of judgment, is the
lifference that mystique makes in creating a profession.
'urther initiatives and expansion of the findings were determined by Van Peursem
2004}, who revealed that internal auditors in New Zealand do not enjoy the cruciality
If mystique or the importance that marks true professionals. Without such influence,
nternal auditors may not be in the position to influence management when
nanagement's actions are inappropriate, and they may not be heard by, or influence,
hose in governance to the degree needed. Therefore, to perform their role effectively,
nternal auditors need to overcome role ambiguity. This is consistent with the findings
,y Senatra (I980}, who found that authority was significant and negatively correlated
vith role ambiguity. This indicates that internal auditors with higher authority have
ower role ambiguity. The lack of clarity in role expectations does have a negative
:onsequence. Internal auditors reporting high role ambiguity tend to be less dedicated to
heir profession, and lack specified knowledge about how to perform well (Timothy and
.awrence, 2000).
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'om the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance perspective, the internal auditor is
ie of the four cornerstones of corporate governance - along with the board,
anagement and external auditor (IIA, 2003; Grambling et al., 2004).The authority for
ich party is defined except for the internal audit function, which is loosely explained.
he code, for example, defines the board of directors as persons entrusted with the
ower and authority to act on behalf of the company. The board should establish an
idit committee of at least three directors, the majority of whom are independent, with
ritten terms of reference that deal with its authority and duties. External auditors, on
re other hand, are the parties that should independently report to shareholders in
ccordance with statutory and professional requirements, and independently assure the
oard on the discharge of its responsibilities in accordance with professional guidance.
inally, for the internal audit function, the major descriptions are for the audit
ornmittee to review the adequacy of the scope, functions and resources of the internal
udit function and, among others, to consider the major findings of internal
rvestigations and management's response. The description in the code on the four
ornerstones of corporate governance implies that internal auditors may not understand
Ie power of the appropriate authority for their work. Thus, if the internal auditors are
iemselves confused about their functions and accountabilities" how can they perform
ieir role? Therefore, based on the issues discussed, this paper intends to look into the
elationship between the internal auditors' roles and authority, and what roles they
njoy role clarity, and how many roles contribute to predicting the authority of internal
uditors.
'herefore motivation for this study is identify the relationship between authority and
ales of internal auditors in Malaysia that influence their functions within the
rganization.
'his paper is arranged in 5 sections beginning with introduction The next section
rovides an overview of the literature that forms the underlying framework for the
ypothesis. Then it is followed by a brief description of the research methodology used
n this study. The findings are discussed in section 4 and, finally, section 5 closes with
he conclusion and recommendations.
~he aim of this study is to identify the relationship between the roles of the internal
uiditors and authority. Previous studies throughout the world have extensively
5
.cussed the varying roles of the internal auditors IA (Lawrence and William, 2008;
-orge and Norman, 2008; Timmoty and Lawrence, 2007; CBOK, 2006; IIA Belgium,
06; Marco et aI., 2006; Van Peursem, 2004, 2005; Burns et aI., 1994). Thus, the aim
this study is also to investigate the varying roles of the internal auditors and their
lationship to authority. This is done through responses derived from the internal
ditors themselves on how they perceive their work. On the whole the objectives of
is study are specified as follows:
i. To determine the perception of internal auditors on their role.
I. To discover the factors that contribute to internal auditors' role and their
relationship to authority.
ii. To determine the differences between the perceived roles of internal auditors who
work under the existence of an Audit Charter, and those who do not.
order to meet the objectives, the following research questions are developed.
f: What is the relationship between the lA's Role and Authority?
?: Does the existence of the Audit Charter show a difference in the lA's perceived role
td authority?
1:How much does each role (element) predict the authority of the IA?
4: Which element of the lA's authority scores the highest?
Literature Review
he lA's role is unique because the lA is an agent that monitors the actions of another
gent (management), both of whom are employed by the same principal (Adams, 1994).
rternal auditors play an important role in evaluating the effectiveness of control
(stems, and contribute to the ongoing effectiveness of the organization. Internal
uditors today do not just focus on financial information, which has typically been a
riority for many firms, but have a much broader responsibility. Management today rely
pon internal auditors not just to reduce the cost of external auditing, but to provide
ssurance, confidence and trust that the internal controls are operating effectively, and
rat the business itself is efficient (Al-Twaijry et aI., 2003). Internal auditors can playa
6
tal role in adding value to the business. Having said this, it is inevitable that internal
iditors are often placed in very difficult positions, especially when they are seen as the
:arers of bad news about the performance of line management
re role as decision support makes internal auditors act positively for the organization
I helping managers identify, assess, and mitigate risks that can affect a unit or a
·ocess. Claus and Peter (2007) suggest that the focus on risk management, and the role
, the supervisory board in aligning the management's risk appetite with the strategy
:tting of the company has enhanced the importance of the function of the internal
iditors. Internal auditors serve actively as risk monitors for the management and the
lard, or the audit committee. The internal auditors' role in risk assessment can be
msidered a necessary input for their evaluation of the internal control system, and is
1 integral part of their assurance role (Gerrit and Ignace, 2006). In the Malaysian
ienario, it has been found that the role performed by internal auditors in risk
ssessment is still low due to the lack of management support (Norlida et ai., 2007).
'orporate governance is an important entity-level factor that sets the tone for the overall
ontrol environment that has significant implications for auditors' risk judgments
)ivesh et ai., 2008). Conor and Jenny (2007) suggest that if internal audit is to be
onsidered a critical component of corporate governance, it is important that
ractitioners in the area have strong support when making ethical decisions. According
) Performance Standard 2130 of the lIA' s International Professional Practices
ramework, internal audit activity should assess and make appropriate
ecornmendations for improvement to the governance process (Gramling and
lermanson, 2008).
tishel and Ivancevich (2003) reveal the important role of the internal auditors in the IT
mplementation process. Both authors argue that the internal auditors' role has
raditionally focused on risk management issues and control testing, particularly in the
re-implernentatlon and monitoring phases of IT projects, rather than them playing an
ntegral role in enhancing the viability of IT implementation. The study suggests that
ntemal auditors can and should provide input with regard to system configuration in
irder to ensure that the proper integral controls are in place, and that this should be
7
nmunicated to the IT team to make sure that new systems, and modifications to
sting systems, are sufficiently documented.
vious literature has highlighted the need for technical competency, which is
.itively related to auditor judgment performance when the complexity of the audit
(is considered (Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987; Libby and Tan, 1994; Shelton,
)9; Lin et aI., 2003). Therefore, internal auditors must review and refine their
hnical knowledge and skills continuously by mastering the latest automated
hnologies that can improve an organization's monitoring risks and internal controls.
truly professional behavior is able to intimidate any audience who threatens a
ifession's autonomy, be they employers, clients or of other occupations. One
portant relationship between members of a profession and others in the work world is
t of authority. When members of an occupation lack power, beyond that of argument
persuasion, in dealing with employers or clients, this implies equality between the
ties .. Argument or rational persuasion does not suggest a relationship characterized
authority. When an occupation must rely solely upon argument or persuasion in
itrolling others, this is prima facie evidence that it lacks the status of a genuine
ifession. Authority relationships have their roots in fears, doubts, anxieties and
otional dependencies, not in rationality. When critical issues arise to threaten their
:onomy, professions have the means to protect their interests by intimidation
·iedrich, 1972). Thus, Friedrich reveals that intimidation has a significant relationship
th authority.
e role of internal auditors within a firm should become clearer for internal auditors
er time. Roles mean a set of expectations for behavior, which are poorly
mmunicated and potentially dysfunctional (Kahn et aI., 1964). This condition is
ated to the issue of clarity (role ambiguity). The expectation that role ambiguity will
o be related to professionalism for internal auditing finds its basis in the conflicts
tween professional and organisational norms (Chambers, 1995; Chambers et aI.,
87; Barber, 1963). The high degree of uncertainty in professional endeavors (Lortie,
75) relates to the lack of confidence that an employee perceives about his or her
.ponsibility and authority within the firm (Lawrence and William, 2007).
ofessionalism involves a certain degree of decision making, but in a way that is not
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sly technical (Paton, 1971). Nevertheless, too much unresolved role ambiguity in the
-kmay hinder the appearance of professional authority (Beckman, 1990).
yer et al. (2002) suggest a somewhat positive association between role ambiguity
continuance commitment. The basic understanding of the lA's role is one of
damental "checks and balances" for sound corporate governance. A robust and
ective IA with the skills to identify risk control problems and the authority to pursue
concerns is essential to the proper discharge of responsibilities. A strong internal
it activity should be able to influence management, and the idea of cruciality
.lores the situation whereby management will be more likely to accept a
ommendation if the internal audit team exhibits a strong sense of authority (Van
irsem, 2004).
:rnal audit authority is established through reporting lines or structure, relationship
h the audit committee and senior management, professionalism and the internal
.it's reputation and credibility (IIA Standard). There has always been a question as to
ether internal auditors will be more empowered if they think of internal audit as a
fession in its own right; supported by the organization they serve, rather than as
te type of stepping stone into corporate management.
ving the internal audit function performed by external auditors and other service
viders is commonly known as outsourcing. Many companies outsource their internal
lit function to outside public accounting firms, consulting firms or other service
viders (Arnold, 2008). Economic pressures have forced many companies to consider
sourcing as an alternative. The internal audit function is evolving from its traditional
rsight function to one that includes a wider spectrum of activities that add value to
ir organization (Chapman and Anderson, 2002). Their findings indicate that the
ent of support was less significant in the case of outsourced auditors. This indicates
t the judgment of internal auditors is significantly influenced by their support
ition and, to a lesser extent, by the identity of the outsourced auditors (Ahlawat and
Ne,2004).
tsourcing the internal audit is not necessarily the best response to cost-cutting
ssure, especially when a corporation is seeking to decentralize its decision-making
9
hority (Hodgson and Puschaver, 1995). Internal audit should move into value-added
ivity or else the internal audit function risks being perceived as an overhead, and
:n worse, being outsourced (Liu et aI., 1997). This implies that the roles performed
outsourcing the IA are concerned with the technical aspects, which are known as
ue added activities, such as the technical role, system involvement role, governance
e and risk management support role. In-house lA, however, involves more of the
ditional aspects of auditing such as operational and compliance.
nold (2008) revealed that outsourced internal auditors are contractors rather than
ployees, and, thus, are not subject to the same potential degree of control by
nagement as would internal auditors who are employees. The author found that
:sourced internal auditors advocated management's position to a lesser extent than in-
rse internal auditors. The nature of the employer-employee relationship provided an
rironment in which the views and decisions of the internal auditors were influenced
ppropriately. Thus, the opinions of internal auditors were significantly influenced by
ir support position, and to a lesser extent, by the identity of the internal audit
rvider. This reinforces the view that objectivity in practice is essentially a myth
organ 1988). Caplan and Emby (2004) used a series of cases involving tests of
itrol, such as a routine internal audit assignment, to compare internal auditors with
tside auditors, and found a substantial similarity between the two groups. They
iclude that there are minor feature differences between the internal and outside
Iitors. This is consistent with an earlier study by Hadden et al. (2003). The authors
md no significant difference between in-house and outsourced internal auditors, in
ir perceived IT qualifications and activities, and suggested that the internal auditors'
e on IT oversight was rated "above moderate".
e audit charter provides internal auditors with their rights, and authorizes them to
ve direct access to any documents, people and records within the organization. This
-clves communication with any member of staff, to examine any activity or entity of
: clients, as well as access to any records, files or data of the clients, including
magernent information and the minutes of all consultative and decision-making
dies. The charter usually states the terms and conditions whereby the internal audit
:ivity can be called upon such as consulting or advisory services or other special
ks, and the charter is communicated throughout the organization. To undertake all
10
challenges in an organizational setting, the internal auditor relies on the audit
ter, for his authority. The audit charter should be re-evaluated periodically, and be
iciently flexible to incorporate a changing business environment. The audit charter
serve as a tool for keeping internal auditors relevant and up to date or it can be an
nor slowing down processes and progress (Charles Zhang, 1999).
vious literature has highlighted that the Internal Audit charter is an important
:hanism to formally and indirectly convey the internal audit's scope, role and
vities. The Attribute Standard 1000 in the IIA's standards for the Professional
ctice of Internal Auditing states that the purpose, authority and responsibility of the
mal audit activity should be formally defined in a charter (IIA Standard 1000).
rit and Ignace (2005) formulated specific suggestions to reduce the gaps between
expectations and perceptions related to the interaction between the audit commitee
~) members and the IA in their case study. The authors revealed that both parties
lid benefit from a clear communication about the specific role and mission of
mal auditors through the spread of the internal audit charter or a formal presentation
he function.
icer and Nagy's (2004) study compared the charters of eight companies with the
irmation gathered from their internal audit directors on the roles and activities of
r departments. Their study revealed that properly constructed internal audit and
it committee charters can communicate the department's orientation and role to the
ropriate parties. A breakdown in this communication could lead to a
understanding of the roles and functions of the internal auditor.
ernal auditors should have a reporting line to the audit committee that should be
hrined in internal audit charters (ICAEW, 2000). However, Van Peursem (2004)
ealed that the existence of an audit charter does not appear to clarify the differences
ween role and authority. Therefore, it is questionable as to what extent the audit
uter helps to define the IA role in the organization.
·lier literature has highlighted that the internal audit charter is an important
chanism to formally and indirectly convey an internal auditor's scope, role and
ivities. To meet the challenges that internal auditors face in a changing environment,
audit charter provides a mandate for their authority. Moreover, to effectively play
11
r roles, internal auditors need unambiguous, practical and flexible terms of
renee, usually referred to as the charter, and to be more effective, this charter should
accepted by the audit committee. For this reason, the audit charter should be re-
luated periodically, and be sufficiently flexible to incorporate a changing business
ironment, and to spell out the responsibilities of the IA. The audit charter can serve
l tool for keeping internal auditors relevant and up to date or it can be an anchor
ving down processes and progress (Charles Zhang, 1999).
~anizations that prectise internal audit believe that it is essential that it has a charter.
: audit charter describes items such as authority, responsibility, method of operation,
ition in the organization and reporting structure, but these are not enough (Mort,
II). The author suggested that internal auditors can seek to increase or strengthen
r authority within the organization in a number of ways. In order to gain that
tority, internal auditors need to embark on a range of complex audits and to match
speed with which risks can take place in the organization. The importance of
iority, and the ability to earn that authority, is a never ending story. It is the
fessionalism and quality of the internal audit work that will show boards, senior
ragement and regulators that the function does add value.
: lA's authority can be established through proper monitoring by the audit committee
:erms of support and decision structure . Theoretically, the Chief Audit Executive
\'E) should report functionally to the board or audit committee, and administratively
he chief executive officer of the organization. The functional reporting line for the
smal audit function is the ultimate source of independence and authority (Rolandas,
15). Greenspan et al. (1994) developed an instrument by asking internal auditors to
ke tender offer recommendations to the management on an 8-point Likert scale. The
trument informed the subject on how each of the four different interest groups would
rd to benefit from the tender offer, and asked the respondents to make a
ommendation to the management based on how these different interest groups
iefited. However, the results showed that there was no consensus as to which group
auditors should place in the priority position. The author showed that existing
ndards result in considerable ambiguity in defining the role of internal auditors. To
ercorne ambiguity, HOCK (2006) suggests that the purpose, authority, and
ponsibility of the internal audit activity should be formally defined in a charter,
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sistent with the Standards, and approved by the board. The internal audit charter
vides internal auditors with a formal mandate to do their work. This charter should
written by, and authorized the board of directors and senior management. This
rter also clarifies the authority that the internal audit activity has, to access records,
sonne1and physical properties within the organization.
the basis of the literature review and the research questions, the following
otheses are set for this study:
'1 = There is a significant relationship between -IA roles and authority.
'2 = There is no significant difference in the perceived role between the outsourced
IA (public accounting or consulting firm) and the internally employed IA
(private or government organization).
'3 = Internal auditors who operate under the authority of the audit charter have
a different perceived role from those who do not operate under the audit
charter.
'4 =Authority can be predicted by the role clarity enjoyed by IA in the varying roles
performed.
.J !le~t:a_r~~!~111n~~ork
Methodology
research model was developed to show the relationship or linkage between the
ependent variables (IV) and the dependent variables (DV). This model is the
indation on which the entire study is based. Figure 3.1 displays different kinds of
iables and the relationships among them. The DV is represented by authority and the
's are eight roles performed by the IA. This relationship answered the first hypothesis
this study (HI). Subsequently, additional variables were included such as the
ployment type, audit charter and respondent type for hypothesis testing. These
iables were included to investigate whether differences exist in each of the variables
teemed as two different groups exist in each of the variables. These three (3)
·iables are linked to the IVs of this study and answered hypotheses two to four (H2,
" and H4). Finally, from the overall result a model was developed where the IVs
:dict a variance in DV.
Figure 3.1: Research Model
Comment [NZ1]: I suggest we condense the
whole literature review and bring some of them
under a new sub-title "conceptual framework", Bring
also the research model part into this new sub-topic.
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EMPLOYEMENT TYPE
Private/Government Organization Vs.
Public Accounting/Consulting Firm
..
INTERNAL AUDITOR ROLE
Comm.mication Role AUTHORITY
Management Intimidation
~
Technlcal R~e
Risk Management Support
Control Oversight
JH1 &H4JDecision Support
System Involvement
Governance Role
&
AUDIT CHARTER
Wth AC existence Vs. Without AC existence
lethodology
basic research design utilized for this study was a survey. The questionnaire was
pted from Van Peursem (2004 and 2005) in which seven similar constructs were
I to represent the varying roles of internal auditors. An additional construct was
ed based on the current scenario of the Malaysian context. In this study, random
piing was used to obtain jrespondents. Random selection of the individual
ervation of the research sample is an appropriate means to obtain an accurate and
·esentative sample (Abu Musa, 2006).
: population base for this study are members of the IIA Malaysia (HAM).
mbership records, as at 2008, consisted of 244 corporate registered members and
13 individual registered members. The random sampling technique was applied to
:ct individual registered members. The number of questionnaires distributed were
(samples) out of 2,257 population. Final questionnaires were sent through the mail
by email.
swered questionnaires received were 123. The response rate of for the email survey
• 4 percent and 18 percent for the mail survey .. It is lower compared to the 73
cent received by Van Peursem(2004) in New Zealand in the latter's study on
.rnal auditors. Although the questionnaires were sent through IIA Malaysia, which is
14
irofessional body representing internal auditors, a high response rate was not
:ved. In total, the number of questionnaires received was 123, and 114 acceptable
-vations were utilized in the analysis.
ysis
the Cronbach's Alpha (a) for each item was carried out to ensure the internal
ity of the questions. Based on the analysis, the communication role had to be
ed as the Cronbach's Alpha value was only 0.39, which is lower than 0.5. Nunnally
~) suggested that an alpha of 0.5 or 0.6 is sufficient in the early stages. Since the
a value for communication is lower than suggested by previous literature, the
nunication role was excluded for further statistical analysis.
all, the Cronbach's Alpha value after the initial cleaning was .857, and it was
y reliable. The Alpha Coefficients ranged from 0.73 to 0.96. The higher the Alpha,
lore reliable the test. Therefore, this is consistent with Nunally (1978) who reveals
ilthough there is not a generally agreed cut-off, 0.7 and above is acceptable .
.descriptive statistic and multiple regression analysis were performed. Although
(2000) suggested that factor scores can be used, it was not carried out due to the
ample size. The sample size should be taken into consideration, as correlations are
esistant (Moore and McCabe 2002), and, consequently, can seriously influence the
iility of the factor analysis (Habing, 2003). In addition, small sample sizes may
t the factor analysis by making the solution unstable: the addition of more data
cause the variables to switch from one factor to another.
ndings and Discussion
s section, the findings based on the statistical analyses performed on the data are
esented. First, the data was analyzed to understand its demographic pattern. Next,
vpotbeses were tested and, finally, the results of multiple regressions are presented.
Demographic Analysis
: 5.1 shows the profile of the respondents. The overall distribution of males and
les in the sample were 61 percent and 39 percent respectively, with a slightly
15
ligher percentage of males within the IIA Malaysia membership subgroup. In this
inalysis,respondents' ages ranged from 21 to 41 and above. The respondents' audit
NOrkexperience ranged from less than 1 year to more than 20 years. The highest
IUrationof audit work experience was between 11 to 15 years (33.3 percent), followed
Oy 6 to 10 years (28.9%). The lowest was less than 1 year (.9 percent). In terms of the
edUcationlevel of the respondents, 77.2 percent have a Bachelor Degree. A 19.3 percent
~avea master degree qualification. Only 3.5 percent of the respondents have academic
qUalificationsequivalent to certificate/diploma level.
to a question concerning tertiary qualifications in areas other than accounting or
aUditing,only 23.7 percent have academic qualifications outside the field, while the
relllaining76.3 percent respondents do not have any other tertiary qualifications. In the
CUrrentstudy, 3.5 percent of the respondents reported having a computer/Information
technology qualification followed by Engineering 2.6 percent; Science 1.8 percent and
the residual accumulated to 15.8 percent. It indicates a low level of multiple
COlllpetencyamong internal auditors in Malaysia. In contrast with the study by Van
~eursam(2004), a total of 58 percent of the auditors in New Zealand had a qualification
inareas other than accounting (or in addition to accounting). In this study, only 3.5
Percentreported having a computerlInformation Technology qualification followed by
~ngineering (2.6%); Science, (1.8%); and the residual accumulate to (15.8%).
~.InaUy,Table 5.1 shows that 36 percent out of the 114 respondents do not have any
Professional designation, 5.3 percent have more than one professional designation, and
the majority, that is 58.7 percent, have one professional designation. Itwas also evident
thatnot all the 114 respondents were members of UA, Malaysia, and that only 28.9
Percent have a Certified Internal Audit (CIA) professional designation. However, the
Uf\. Malaysia is making serious efforts to encourage more internal auditors to undertake
Professional examinations, which can increase the overall internal audit quality.
~Urthermore,a strong professional association can help to improve the level of authority
Of·Internal auditors (Van Peursam, 2004) .
............._----------------------------------
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S.2 Distribution of Respondents for Hypothesis Testing
The biggest number of the respondents was represented by internal auditors from
Private or government organizations, who made up 86 percent while the remaining
balance of 14 percent of the respondents were internal auditors from public accounting
Orconsulting firms. In relation to the audit charter, 98 out of 114 respondents worked
underthe existence of an audit charter while the remaining 18 respondents were internal
aUditorswho did not work under an audit charter. In terms of the reporting line, all the
respondents indicated that they report directly to audit committees, and in the absence
Ofthe committees, they ultimately report to the Board of Directors, senior executive
lIlanagement or shareholders. This is consistent with recent findings that the degree of
interaction between the audit committees and internal audit functions has increased
dramatically in recent years. This trend reflects an increased focus on corporate
governance, greater scrutiny of risk management, and more direct audit committee
OVersightof internal audit (PWC, 2008).
5.3.1 Hypothesis Testing
Thefirst hypothesis is to determine whether there is a significant relationship between
1ft.roles and authority specifically between the roles clarity enjoyed by internal auditors
Whoundertake varying roles, and Authority.
There is a significant relationship between the fA roles and authority
~tom the hypothesis above, seven (7) sub hypothesis were developed as follows:
Hl (a)= There is a significant relationship between the fA's control oversight role
and authority.
tu (b)= There is a significant relationship between the IA's decision support
role and authority.
Ii/(c)= There is a significant relationship between the fA's risk management support
role and
authority.
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HI (d)= There is a significant relationship between the lA's governance role and
authority.
HI (e)= There is a significant relationship between the lA's system involvement role
and
authority.
HI(/)= There is a significant relationship between the lA's technical role and
authority.
HI(g)= There is a significant relationship between the lA's management
intimidation role and authority.
Table 5.2 below indicates that there is a significant (r = 0.38, P < 0.05) moderate
Positive correlation between the IA (MgmtIntimidate) role and (AUTHORITY), thus,
1{1(g) is accepted. This indicates that the respondents perceived the management
intimidation role, which consists of four elements, namely, conducting follow up
investigations; follow up testing; coordinating with external auditors; and regular
rePorts to the governing body, as significant factors that can contribute to their
aUthority.The technical role also reveals a significant but weak positive correlation with
II\.(AUTHORITY), represented by r = 0.24, P < 0.05, therefore, HI (/) is accepted.
In contrast, there is no significant correlation between the IA ContOversight;
l)ecisionSupp; Systemlnvolve and RiskMgmtSupp roles with IA (AUTHORITY), as
thevalue is close to zero represented by (r = 0.l7, P > 0.05); (r = 0.07, P > 0.05); (r =
0.50, P > 0.05) and (r = 0.16, P > 0.05). The governance role, the additional role added
by the current author, indicates the same result (r = 0.18, P > 0.05). There is no
Significant value for the correlation between the IA Systemlnvolve; ContOversight;
l)ecisionSupp; RiskMgmtSupp and Governance roles with IA (AUTHORITY).
Therefore, HI (a), HI (b), HI (c), HI (d) and HI (e) were rejected as they signify a
lVeakrelationship, which may be derived by chance, accidentally or without planning.
" ......_-----------------------------------
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Generally, the results revealed that there is a weak correlation between the lA's role and
authority. This indicates that the internal auditor authority is not strongly linked with
the internal auditor roles. This perhaps suggests that authority and the internal auditor
rolesare not equivalently measured .. Role ambiguity is negatively associated with the
jobperformance of auditors (Gregson et al., 1994; Rebele and Michaels, 1990; Viator,
2001a, 2001b). Senatra (1980) found a negative, but not significant relationship,
between the lA's role and authority, which emerged because of the authority level they
Possess in the organization. The llA should accentuate role clarity (measured by
internal auditor's authority) as well as other elements that are needed to safeguard the
internalauditor authority.
S.3.2 Association Between The Employment Type and fA Perceived Roles
'the second hypothesis is to examine whether the employment type of internal auditors
lVillaffect their perceived roles.
1f2 == There is no significant difference in the perceived role between the outsourced fA
(Public accounting or consulting firm) and internally employed fA (private or
government organization).
!\ccording to table 5.3, the internal auditors from public accounting or consulting firms
havehigher mean scores compared to the internal auditors from private or government
Organizations. The results show differences between the two groups in terms of the
Controloversight role (mean = 20.69 and 20.35); risk management support role (mean =
7.19 and 6.83); governance role (mean = 7.50 and 7.38) and technical role (mean =
22.19 and 21.90). Even though the internal auditors from the public accounting or
consulting firms have the higher mean score compared with those from private and
government organizations, the management intimidation role mean score is higher for
the internal auditors from private or government organization (mean = 16.22 and 15.81)
lViththe highest mean difference of AI. This implies that if the IA functions were
OUtsourced,it is less effective in asserting findings that can influence the management.
Sitnilarly, Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) found that the judgments of outsourced auditors
lVeresignificantly influenced by their support position and to a lesser extent the identity
as such.
'------------------------------
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Further, the results presented in Table 5.3 correlates consistently with the results
revealed in the subsequent hypothesis test related to the existence of the audit charter
(lf3). A larger percentage of respondents from private or government organizations
lVorkedunder the existence of the audit charter, and it was found that internal audit
OUtsourcingis not dominantly or widely practised in Malaysian organizations. this
Paperwill go into how the audit charter influences lA's perceived roles.
5.3.3 Association Between Audit Charter And Perceived Roles
the third hypothesis is to examine whether the existence of the audit charter affects
I,o\'sperceived roles.
1f3 = Internal auditors who operate under the authority of the audit charter have
different perceived roles from those who do not operate under the audit charter.
In this hypothesis, the existence of an audit charter (H3) is tested. From table 504, there
isa significant mean difference among the different roles: decision support role (mean
difference = .72); technical role (mean difference = 040); management intimidation role
(tneandifference = 040) and risk management support role (mean difference = .34). For
the other three roles, the mean difference = < .20. This indicates that the internal
qllditorsassumed more technical and specialized skills of audit engagement without the
!l(istenceof charter. This result is consistent with Van Peursem (2004) .
....... ------------------------------
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this result, which attempts to answer research question 3 (R3), revealed that even
thOugh85 percent of the respondents have a charter, these internal auditors in Malaysia
do not utilise the charter to enforce the authority available to them. Moreover, the
i~ternal auditors have the opportunity to enhance their role through the authority and
illandate specified by the local regulatory bodies such as the recent reformed rules
(~008)by Bursa Malaysia's listing requirements. These requirementsmake it mandatory
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forcompanies listed on the stock exchange to have an internal audit department, which
willwork in conjunction with an audit charter.
FUrthermore, the Attribute Standard 1000 in the ITA Standards for the Professional
Practiceof Internal Auditing, which states that the purpose, authority and responsibility
of the internal audit activity should be formally defined in a charter (UA, A.IOOO), is
Widelypractised by the internal audit activity in Malaysia given the large number of
charterrespondents.
5.3.4 Role Clarity and Authority
H4 = Authority can be predicted by the role clarity enjoyed by the internal auditor
in the varying roles they perform.
A.nalysisof variance (ANOV A) and multiple regressions are used for this hypothesis.
A.NOVA suggests whether the overall model is significant. Also, if the overall model is
Significant, then at least one or more of the individual variables will most likely have a
Significant relationship to the DV. The result revealed that only one out of seven IV's,
that is the management intimidation role, has a significant relationship with
A.UTHORITY. Using the enter method, a significant model emerged through the
tnanagement intimidation role. The model indicates that the correlation between the IVs
andthe DV is weak (R=.190). The lA's management intimidation role explains 13.7%
(percent) variance (Adjusted R Square) in the IA AUTHORITY. This regression line is
Significant from 0.00 (F7, 106 = 3.563, p<.05). The significant variables are shown in
table 5.5.
,-----------------------------------
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hom the model parameter (Table 5.6) presented below, the management intimidation
role is significantly related to AUTHORITY, .591 (95% Cl = .253 to .929). It indicates
that the coefficient in population is also positive (t =3.46; p<.05). The Beta value of the
COefficient for management intimidation role is weak (.34). The p-value for other
variables, (ContOversight); (DecisionSupp); (RiskMgmtSupp); (Governance);
(Systemlnvolve) and (Technical) are more than alpha = 0.05. Therefore, these variables
arenot significant predictors.
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table 5.7 presents the model summary from the statistical analysis. The model
SUmmarypresents R Square (If), which is the variance explained b,5'the IVs and the If
~.190. The "Adjusted R Square" correcteds the number of variables in the analysis.
~achpredictor explains some variance due to chance. Therefore, the more variables in
theanalysis, the higher the "R Square" due to chance. Since this study tested many
variables, the Adjusted R Square is used instead of R Square. All the roles undertaken
by internal auditors, except for the system involvement role, are positively related to the
Criterion variable. However, only Mgmtlntimidate is a significant predictor of
AUTHORITY, whereas, the System Involve (/3 =.-.029, P > 0.05) is negatively related
to the criterion variable. Therefore, the predictor only accounts for 13.7% variance in
theDV and it is represented by the management intimidation role.
'----------------------------------
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therefore the predicted equation for the IA Authority is:
t AUTHORITY =. 14.45 + 0.59 Mgmtlntimidate
the statistical result reveals that across the seven variables tested, only one model
ell1erged.This is the only factor evidently representing clarity and these factors can be
~lIderstoodin terms of "intimidation".
the Burns, Greenspan and Hartwell (1994) intimidation model revealed the power of
intimidation, exercised through the perceived value and complexity of a discipline, to
determine whether or not a profession was likely to enjoy the real influence needed to
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fulfill its roles. Furthermore, from the cruciality perspective, Burns et ai., (1994)
~dicate that management will be more likely to accept a recommendation or a warning
ifthe internal audit team exhibits a strong sense of authority. According to Burns and
liaga (1977), the ultimate means of maintaining autonomy in their work world is, to put
itbluntly, intimidation.
the above result consistently implies what was suggested and explored by Van
~eursem (2004). The author revealed that internal auditors enjoy the authority over, and
theindependence from management that they might expect from a professional, through
the intimidation role. In the Malaysian context, there has not been much discussion
about the authority of internal auditors. In general, it is perceived that the role and
authority will comply with the International Professional Practice Framework (IPPF).
the findings would interestingly describe the current state of practice, and assist
internalauditors in strengthening their position.
the result of H4, which answered the fourth research question (R4) shows that, out of
seven roles tested, only one role undertaken by internal auditors, which is the
ltianagement intimidation role, contributes towards predicting the variance In the
Criterionvariable. Subsequently, the governance role added in the current study does
not act as a significant predictor to explain variance in the criterion variable,
~UTHORITY. Though the lA's management intimidation role is a significant predictor
OfAUTHORITY, this construct only explained 13.7 percent variance in AUTHORITY.
the findings also suggest that the characteristics of a "true" professional exist through
themanagement intimidation role undertaken by internal auditors. The authority made
available to internal auditors through the Standards of the I1A profession; audit charter
eXistence; free access to audit committee; producing regular reports for senior
ltianagementigoverning body; reporting to a higher level in the organization (if the
ltianagement fails to respond) and decision making at the most senior level of the
Organization; all contribute to role clarity so that the IA can act in the organization's
best interests. This suggests that internal auditors need some intimidation power in each
tOle undertaken to preserve the authority associated with it. Van Peursem (2004)
SUggestedthat the characteristics of a "true" profession exist due to the management
Intimidation role undertaken by the internal auditor. Authority is gained through a23
!trongaudit charter and also the criteria described above. With strong authority, internal
auditorswould not feel like they were risking their employment when they performed
~eir roles .. Likewise, armed with authority, auditors' access to senior executive
illanagement and the audit committee or board of directors would be significantly
!trengthened. Authority is gained through a strong audit charter, and also the criteria
describedabove. In order to identify the type of elements that are crucial to enhance the
aUthorityof internal auditors, an analysis was carried out to rank the mean of the
authorityelements.
5.4 Results of Mean Rank for AUTHORITY Elements
the three most important perceived authority elements, as ranked by the majority of the
tespondents, are upholding the standard of the IlA profession (mean = 4.58), audit
charterexistence represents authority of internal auditors (Mean = 4.50) and free access
to audit committee (Mean = 4.46). Furthermore, the majority of respondents also
believe that decision making at the most senior level of the organization (Mean = 3.59)
and agreeing with managers the purpose of their investigation before commencing
(Mean = 3.75), are the two least important for internal auditors' role clarity in order to
Preservethe internal auditors' authority.
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Table 5.8: Mean Rank for Elements of AUTHORITY Reported by
Respondents (N = 114)
Mean Std. Deviation
Upholding The Standard of the IlA profession 4.58 .530
Audit Charter Existence representing the Authority of
Internal
4.50 .613
Auditor
Free access to Audit Committee 4.46
.706
Reporting to a higher level in the organization if 4.34 .676
management fails to respond
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Producing regular reports for senior management or
governing body
Agreeing with managers the purpose of my
investigation before commencing
Decision making at the most senior level of the
Organization
4.17 .703
3.75 1.012
3.59 1.127
the results indicate, consistent with the recommendation of Burns et al. (1994) that
llPholding the standard of the ITA profession possibly increases the profession's
,cruciality", which means internal auditors with a strong sense of authority. Such
authority to influence may be acquired in a number of ways: through the existence of an
aUditcharter, a strong audit committee, a strong professional association, or other
Policies that give internal auditors direct and influential access to the highest level of
lllanagement within (or outside) an organization.
6, Conclusion and Recommendations
~rom the findings discussed in the previous section, role ambiguity issues exist among
internal auditors in Malaysia. From the seven roles tested, only the management
intimidation role is clearly supported by the authority given to internal auditors. Six
Otherroles (control oversight, decision support, risk management support, governance,
sYsteminvolvement and technical) lead to the possibility for role conflicts to take place.
"the regression results converge, in some cases, around "intimidation" influence.
l>roviding internal auditors with the authority to perform their work is perhaps the most
important aspect of what organizations can do. Authority has the most pervasive direct
and indirect influence upon internal auditors' role clarity. According to Timothy and
Lawrence (2000), the lack of clarity in role expectations has a negative consequence.
Internal auditors reporting high role ambiguity tend to be less dedicated to their
Profession.
"the findings indicate that the boards of directors should emphasize the proper set up of
an internal audit department, and that this is commensurate with the existence of a
Strong audit committee and clearer approved charter. This result will facilitate the IIA,
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~alaysia, to understand the impact of authority to the role of internal auditor
~Ubsequent1y,all public companies may develop a specific measurement system (KPI)
10 evaluate the effectiveness of the internal auditor roles in public, private and
government organizations. From a practical perspective, the study also provides
feedbackto the regulators (e.g. KLSE) on the need for policies that support and enhance
~e lA's authority through recognized roles.
Pinally, the larger number of in-house, and with charter, respondents; a weak
relationship between the lA's role and authority; the perceived importance of authority
elements by the respondents through the upholding the ITA standard and strong audit
Charter;collectively suggests that texisting audit charters should be revised or updated
accordingly. Considerable attention should be given to specify the lA's varying role
aUthority,according to the nature and the business environment of the organization in
theaudit charter.
Given the limitations of this study (low response and focus on only one geographical
area), there are opportunities for future research by extending the current model to
cover a more extensive population sample. Similar research can also be carried out to
eXplorecomparative data in several geographical locations in the same region such as
China,Hong Kong and Singapore.
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Table 5.1:
Demographic Profile oCthe Respondents
Gender Percentage
Age Percentage
Ethnic Percentage
0/.
0/.
0/.
Male 61
21 -25 2.6
Malay 56.1
Fe.nale 39
26-30 16.7
Chinese 38.6
31 - 35 32.5
Indian 3.5
36-40 21.1
Others 1.8
> 40 27.2
Highest Percentage
Audit Percentage
Other Percentage
level (%)
Experience (0/0)
Tertiary (0/0)
Education
Qual ificatio
Certificatel 3.5
-c 1 year .9
None 76.3
Diptolna
Bachelor 77.2
1 - 5 years 11.4
COluputerllT 3.5
Degree
Post 19.3
6 - 10 years
Engineering 2.6
Graduate
28.9
Degree 11 - 15 33.3
Science 1.8
years
16-20 14.0
Business 9.5
years
> 20 years 11.4
Econon"lY 6.3
Professional Percentage
Professional Frequency
Nwnber of Frequency
Designation (%)
Designation
Designation
None 36
MACPA 2
-I 67
-1 58.7
ACCA II
-2 6
> I 5.3
CIA 33
>2 None
CPA 8
Others 25
Table 5.2: Pearson Product Moment Correlation between the lA's
Role and Authority (N= 114)
34
ContO\lersight DecisionSuPP RiskMgmtSupp Gcwemance Systemhwolve Technical Mgmtlntimidation AUTHORITY
-.068 .29(f .199'
-.012 .150 .272"'
.168
.473 .002 .034
.898 .112 .003
.075
.093 -.054
.583- -.024 -.162 .073
.327 .565 .000
.797 .085 .441
.479
M .182 .141 .202'
.159
.000 .053 .134
.032 .091
-.031 .215' 341
.178
.746 .022 .000
.058
.115 -.087 .050
.223 .357 .595
.284- .242-
.002 .010
.384-
.000
:
ContOverllght Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2..tailed)
DecitionSupp Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-lo;led)
RiskMgmtSupp Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Governance Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2~ailed)
SystemlnvoNe Pearson
Correlation
5ig. (2..tailed)
Technical Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-lo;led)
Mgmtlntimidation Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-lailed)
AUTHORIn' Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-loiled)
". Con'elation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) .
-, Con'elatton is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 5.3: Mean Comparison for Perceived Roles by Employment Types
Employment Type
(N= 114)
(n = 98)
Outsourced Internal
Auditor
In House Internal Auditor
(n = 16)
Mean Standard Mean
Standard
Deviation Deviation
Control Oversight Role 20.35
2.65 20.69 2.55
Decision Support Role 5.88
2.17 5.63 2.63
Risk Management Support Role 6.83
2.57 7.19 2.26
Governance Role
7.38 2.09 7.50
1.71
System Involvement Role 30.27
8.22 30.00 7.69
35
Technical Role
Management Intimidation Role
21.90 4.10 22.19
4.09
16.22 1.97 15.81
2.29
-
Table 5.4: Mean Comparison for Audit Charter Existence
00 you have charter for the
Internal Audit Department? N
Mean Std. t:»viation
std. Error Me.n
ContOversight WllhCharter
96 20.4167 2.61842
.26724
Without CMrter
18 20.2778 2.76119
.65082
OecislonSupp WrthCharter
96 5.7292 2.1&420
.22088
Without Charter
18 6.4«" 2.52569
,59531
RiskMgmtSupp With Charter
96 6.8229 2.56698
.26199
Without Charter
18 7.1687 2.30728
.54383
Govemance With Chart.r
96 7.4062 2.085-43
.21284
Without Chert.r
18 7.3333 1.78221
.42008
Systemlnvotve WithCherter
96 30.2604 7.98979
.81545
Without Charter
18 30.0556 9,02592
2.12143
Techntcal WithChart.,r
96 21.8750 .. 17574
.42619
Without Chart.r
18 22.2778 3.84291
.85866
Mgmtlntlmldatton WithChart.r
96 16.1042 1.90556
.19448
Without Chert.r
18 16.5000 2.52633
.59546
Table 5.5: Results for the Analysis of Variance - ANOVA
b
Model Sum of Squares
df Mean Square
F Sig.
Tolal
259.573
1103.208
1362.781
7
108
113
37.082
10.408
3.563 .002'
Regression
Residual
a. Predictors: (constant), Mgmtlntimidation, Systemlnvolve, contOversight, Technical, RiskMgmlSupp, Governan08,
OecisionSupp
b. Dependent Variable: AUTHORITY
Table 5.6 Model Parameter: Result on Coefficients·
36
Standardize 95%
Unstandardized d
Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients
Interval for B
Std.
Lower Upper
Model B Error
Beta t Sig. Bound
Bound
(Constant)
4.17
14.450 3.460
7.591 21.310
7
ContOversight .065 .124
.049 .5'25 NS -.181
.312
DecisionSupp
1.36
.231 .170 .149
NS -.105 .568
3
RiskMgmtSupp .061 .145
.044 .420 NS -.226 .348
Governance .014 .180
.008 .078 NS -.342
.370
Systemlnvolve -.013 .047
-.029 -.265 NS -.107
.081
Technical
1.46
.116 .079 .136
NS -.041 .273
MgmtIntimidati
3.46
.591 .171 .342
S .253 .929
on
5
Dependent Variable: Authority
Table 5.7: Model Summary for Multiple Regression Analysis
Change Statistics
Adjusted R Std. Error of R Square
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change
F Change df1 df2
Sig. F Change
o. Predictors (constant), Mgmtlntimidation, Systemlnvolve, ContOversight, Technical, RiskMgmtSupp, Goyemanee, DecisionSupp
b. Dependent Vanable: AUTHORITY
.190 .137 3.22606
.190 3.563
106 002
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